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AGENCY-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR FRAUD OF AGENT-MER,CANTILE AGENCIES.-A bank entered into an agreement with a mercantile agency whereby the latter agreed to furnish to the former such
information as they might possess concerning the mercantile standing
and credit of merchants, etc., stipulating, however, that they should not
'be responsible for any loss caused by the negligence of any of their employees in procuring, collecting and communicating said information,
-and that the correctness of information was not guaranteed by them.
'The bank made application to the agency for information as to the standing of a certain merchant. In response to this call the agent of the mercantile agency knowingly made a false report for the purpose of deceiving the bank and benefiting the merchant. The bank relied upon this
information, and sustaining loss in consequence, brought suit against the
mlercantile agency and a verdict against them was sustained, the Court
holding that a principal is civilly liable for the fraud and deceit of his
agent, which is committed for the principal, in the course of business
and is a part of the agent's employment, and within the scope of his
authority, though in fact the principal is ignorant of the act, and this liability is not changed if the agent makes the fraudulent representations not
for his employer, but for his own interest and to serve his own private
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ends: City National Bank of Birmingham v. Dud, Circuit Court of the
United States, Southern District of New York, July 16, 1892, SHIPMAN,
J. (5I Fed. Rep., x6o).-H. L. C.
ARBITRATION-EVOCATION or SuBMISSIoN.-Two railway companies agreed in writing to submit certain matters to arbitration. Before
the award was signed and published, the defendant corporation delivered
to the arbitrators a written revocation of their authority to proceed under
the submission, signed by its president, and accompanied by the vote of
the directors certifying his act. The award having been subsequently
signed and published *bythe arbitrators, an action was brought on the
award by the plaintiff corporation. Held: That the papers executed by
the defendant corporation operated as an unconditional revocation of the
authority of the arbitrators, as they had not then executed their powers
by publication of the award; and this was negatived neither by the fact
that it was agreed that the arbitration might proceed exparteif either
party failed to appear, nor by the fact that, before the revocation, the
arbitrators had orally announced their decision in respect to certain
items in the defendant's statement of claims, as an award must cover all
claims submitted and must be mutual, certain and final: Boston and
L. R. Corp. v, Nashua and L. C. Corp., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, June 27, 1885, per FImLD, J. (31 N. R. Rep., 752).-.H. N . S.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CHAMPERTY-WHAT

CONSTITUTES.-An

attorney entered into an agreement with his client whereby in consideraof the assignment of a judgment to him by his client, he agreed to render legal services in its prosecution and to advance the amount necessary
for the expenses of the case, one half of said expenses to be paid by the
client if the suit was unsuccessful, and if successful the net proceeds of
the judgment to be equally divided. This assignment was attacked by
the client's assignee for the benefit of creditors. Held: That the contract was not without consideration, nor unlawful on the ground of chainperty: Reece v. Kyle, Supreme Court of OhioJune 20, 1892, per SPEAa,
C.J. (31 N. B. Rep., 747).-H. N. S.
COMMON CARRIERs-DUTY TO STOP TRAIN.-Where a conductor
on a train collected a fare to a particular station from one of the passengers, while the train was still within the corporate limits of the city where
the passenger had boarded the train, it is his duty to stop the train at the
particular station, and failing to do so is a breach of the carrier's public
duty, and renders it liable to an action for tort as well as an action on the
contract. The Court added: "It was his duty, if he did not intend to
stop at the station to tell the passengerso, decline to take the money,
stop the train at once, and allow the passenger to get off in the city :"
Caldwell v. Richmond & D. R. Co., Supreme Court of Georgia, April
27, 1892, LtIMPKIN, J. (I5 Southeastern Rep., Vol. 15, p. 678).-IV. D. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-INTSRSTATS COMMRcE-ORIGINAL PACK-

AGE.-Removing the lid of an original package of oleomargarine, so
that it may be examined, is not such a breaking of the package as will
destroy its character as an original package: In re McAllister, Circuit
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Court of the United States, District of Maryland, June ir,
(57 Fed. Rep., 282).-H. L. C.

1892,

BOND, J.

CONTRACT-FRAUD.-The suit was brought to recover damages for
an injury. It was in evidence that the plaintiff signed a document releasing
the defendants from further liability in consideration of the payment of a
sum of money, which sum had been received by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, an illiterate person, testified that when he signed the document the
contents was not read to him, and he thought it was an ordinary pay roll.
The judge who presided at the trial held that as the plaintiff did not make
a tender of the amount received the jury should find for the defendants.
Held: Error. If the plaintiff had knowingly given a release, and had
sought to set aside the same on the ground of fraudulent representation,
a tender would have had to have been made of any benefithe had received
under the contract containing the release; but as the contention of the
plaintiff was that he did not know he was signingan instrumentpurporting
to contain a contract in reference to his injury, a tender of the amount
received was not necessary. New trial granted: Butler v. Richmond &
D. R. Co., Supreme Court of Georgia, November 23, 1891, BLECKIe~y,
C. J. (I5 Southeastern Rep., 66 9 ).- W. D. L.
COPYRIGHT-DRAMATIC ComPoSITIoN-STAGE DANC.-A stage
dance, popularly known as the "serpentine dance," and illustrated by a
unique combination of lights, shadows and dress, is not a dramatic composition within the meaning of the Copyright Act: Fuller v. Bemis,
Circuit Court S. D., New York, June IS, 1892, LACOMBE, J. (50 Fed. Rep.,
926).-J. 4. .13fC.
CORPORATIONS-CORPORATE NAE-INJuNcTION.-The fact that
the word "Hygeia" was used by a water company prior to plaintiff's
organization; will prevent it from restraining a third company's use of
the same word in its corporate title: Hygeia Water Ice Co. v. New York
Hygeia Ice Co., Supreme Court of New York, June 29, 1892, O'BRIEN, J.
(i9 N. Y. S., 6o2).-J. A. 11cC.

DOWER-DIvEsTmENT OF BY SUIT IN PARTITION.-A wife is
divested of dower in land owned by her husband in common with others
by partition thereof in a suit to which her husband is a party, though
she is not joined; and such is the case also where before the suit he had
conveyed his undivided interest, he and his granter, but not his wife,
being joined as parties: Holley v. Glover, Supreme Court of South
Carolina, July 14, 1892, McIVER, C. J. (1 5 Southeastern Rep., 6o5).
EQUITY-LAcHES.--In an action to vacate a voluntary deed, conveying in trust for the grantor and others property received absolutely
under her grandfather's will, evidence that the grantor a few months
after its execution was advised by legal counsel, that, while unusual in its
provisions, it was unimpeachable; that some years later her father told her
that he also had taken and received similar advice thereon; that upon a
second opinion, taken more than twelve years after, favorable to its impeachment, she promptly brought action, negatives her laches and
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acquiescence: Whitridge v. Whitridge, Supreme Court of Maryland,
MCSHERRY, J., (O'BRIEN, J., diss.) (24 At. Rep., 645).-J.

June 7, 1892,
A. McC.

HABEAS CORPUS-REmOVAL OF PRISONER-JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT CoURT.-A Federal Court has jurisdiction on habeas corfius where
a person who has been arrested upon a warrant based upon an indictment
found in another circuit and is awaiting removal, to look into the indictment, so far as to be satisfied that an offence against the United States is
charged and that it is such an offence as may be lawfully tried in the
forum to whidh it is claimed the accused should be removed: In re
Terrell, Supreme Court of the United States, Southern District of New
York, June 28, 1892, LACOMBE, J. (5I Fed. Rep., 21 3 ).-H. L. C.
INJUNCTION- LABOR UNIONS- INTIMIDATION OF E MPLOEES.1Where the members of a labor union are interfering with the working of
the complainant's mine, and by force, threats and intimidation are preventing employees from working therein, a court of equity will restrain
by injunction such labor union and the members thereof from comiiitting such acts if the defendants are insolvent and the threatened acts
are such that their frequent occurrence may be expected. The rule that
a trespass cannot be enjoined unless upon realty and when the damage is
irreparable, and the right at law must have been established, has no application, as no title to realty is involved, and the acts complained of are
not a direct trespass upon realty, but only such as indirectly affect the
enjoyment of property and other rights. Nor has the rule that equity
will not interfere for the prevention of crime any application, the acts
complained of not being criminal per se, but unlawful only, but which
may lead to the commission of other acts purely criminal: Cceur Dalene
Consolidated and Mining Co. v. Miners' Union of Wander, et al., Circuit
Court of the United States, District of Idaho, July 11, 1892, BEATTY, J.
(51 Fed. Rep., 26o).-H. L. C.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-ORIGINAL PACKAG.-On the trial of an
indictment for selling liquor in violation of law, the defendant's testimony tended to show that he was the agent of a principal who carried on
business in another State, and the latter delivered the liquor to a railway
company for transportation in bottles, each bottle being enclosed in a
paper bag. The company without defendant's knowledge placed the
bottles in boxes, and defendant so received them. Held: that the bottles
and not the boxes were original packages, as they had been received by
the carrier as such, and the packing into boxes was without the knowledge of the consignor: Tinker v. State, Supreme Court of Alabama, June
21, 1892, per THORINGTON, J. (i So. Rep., 38 3 ).-H. N. S.
MECHANICS' LIENS-RIGHTS OP SUB-CONTRACTOR.- A sub-contractor does not lose his right to file a lien on a building by the failure
of the principal contractor to keep his agreement with the owner to deliver the building free of all liens, which was entered into after the sub1

For a criticism of this class of cases, see AbiERICAN LAiv REGISTER AND RE-

viEw, January, 1892. (1) "Equity Jurisdiction as applied to Crimes and Misdemeanors," by R. C. McMurtrie, Esq.
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contractor began work, and of which he had no notice: Cook, et al. v.
Williams, el al., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July 13, 1892, per
STERRETT, J. (24 Atl. Rep., 74 6).-H. A S.
NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY-PASSENGER IN PRIVATZ VErICL.
-One who while riding in the private carriage of another at his invitation, is injured by the negligence of a third person, may recover against
the latter, notwithstanding the negligence of the owner of the carriage in
driving his team may have contributed to the injury, where the person
injured is without fault and has no authority over the driver: Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Lapsby, Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States, Eighth Circuit, June x3, 1892, SANBORN, J. (5I Fed. Rep., 174).H. L. C.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-NOTIcE OF PROTFST-RIEASE.-In
an action by a holder against the endorser of a promissory note, it was
held: (I) That the fact that the holder enclosed a notice of protest in an
envelope, with a direction to return to the sender, if not called for in so
many days, printed thereon, and addressed the envelope to the indorser
by street and number, and deposited it in the mail box; and that the
letter was never returned to him is sufficient to charge the indorser; (2)
part payment by the maker of an overdue note was insufficient consideration to support a promise to extend the time of payment, and the indorser
is not thereby discharged: Manchester v. Van Brunt, City Court'of New
York, July I, 1892, O'BRIEN, J. (i9 N. Y. S., 685).-J. A. McC
SALVAG-PIL.OT-BoAT--PuBLic PoLIcY RiEGULATING COMPENSATION.-Where a steamship went ashore, through fault of her pilot, and
salvage service, in pulling her afloat, was rendered by the pilot boat
attending to take off the pilot. Held: That it was against public policy
that a liberal salvage award should be made to the pilot boat under the
circumstances: The Relief, District Court of the United States, District of
Maryland, July 2, 1892, MORRIS, J. (5I Fed. Rep., 252).-H. L. C.
TRUSTS-MINGLING TRUST FUNDS-ASSIGNMENTS FoOR BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS-PREFERENCES.-A trustee who had been directed by the
Court to invest the trust fund in real estate mortgages, allowed a firm,
of which he was a member, to use these funds without furnishing the
security upon which he was authorized to lend them. Shortly after, the
firm became insolvent, and executed a mortgage to secure these funds,
on the same day that they executed an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. A bill was filed, the object of which was to declare the execution of the mortgage part and parcel of the general assignment. Held:
That in the absence of an agreement in writing, given by the firm at
the time the loan was made, to secure repayment of the money by a
lien on particular property, which can be identified, the cestui que trust,
has no more than the rights of a simple contract creditor, and the firm
cannot prefer him in an assignment. While the lawpermits an insolvent
to prefer one or more creditors by sale of property in satisfaction of debts,
yet a preference in a general assignment, or a mortgage, in which cases
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some interest to the debtor remains in the property, is void: Ellison,
et. al., v. Moses. el. al., Supreme Court of Alabama, May 17, 1892, Per
WALKER, J. (II So. Rep., 347).-H. L. C.
WIL1s-PowERs IN EXECUTION REVOKED REVIVES PRIOR EXEcUTIoN.-A life tenant, with power to dispose of the land by deed or will,
first made a will disposing of the land, and then executed a deed retaining
a bond and mortgage. Subsequently, the land was recpnveyed to the
grantee in satisfaction of the bond and mortgage. Held: That the deed
was rescinded by the reconveyance, that the power of 'the life tenant to
dispose of the property, was not exhausted thereby; and, therefore, the
prior execution of the power by will remained in full force and effect:
Burkett v. Whittemore, Supreme Court of South Carolina, July 3 o , 1892,
MCIVER, C. J. (I5 Southeastern Rep., 616).- W. D. L.

ADDENDUM.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIsSION-DIscRIMINATIoN

N RATES.

-Since the above went to press we have received the following important decision relative to the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The
decision is as follows: Upon the petition of the Interstate Commerce
Commission was filed in the court under the sixteenth section of the
Act to regulate commerce, for the enforcement of its order requiring
the defendant to cease and desist from carrying any article of imported
traffic shipped from any foreign port upon through bills of lading to any
place within the United States at any other than the same rates established by the inland tariff of the defendant for the carriage of other like
kind of traffic, Held,
(I) That the proceeding is not defective because the Southern Pacific
Company, a connecting carrier .participating with defendant in the carriage between certain points, was not made a party defendant herein. If
the defendant is violating a proper order of the Commission it should be
restrained from doing so and it cannot escape upon the objection that
another wrong-doer is also violating it.
(2) The Interstate Commerce Act would be emasculated in its remedial efficacy, if not practically nullified, if a carrier can justify a discrimination in rates merely upon the ground that unless it is given the traffic
obtained by giving it would go to a competing carrier. A shipper having
a choice between competing carriers would only have to refuse to send
his goods by one of them unless given exceptional rates to justify that
6ne in making the discrimination in his favor on the ground of the necessity of the situation. The order prayed for in the petition is granted:
Interstate Commerce Com. v. Texas & Pacific, October 5, 1892, per VALLACE, J.

